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On the one hand, we are persons, thus free morally, and we are capable of becoming
morally mature. On the other hand, we are social animals. Often these sides of human life seem
at odds. I will compare Kant’s modern view with Aristotle’s classical view of freedom and
moral maturity to illustrate that how we philosophically describe our freedom makes a
difference for how we understand our goal of moral maturity.
Kant emphasizes autonomy as the essence of morality, and this autonomy or freedom
contains both a negative from aspect and a positive to aspect. The individual’s moral life is
free from two things especially: desires and other people. He emphasizes freedom from the
passions because the passions, as entwined with the body, are one way in which we are
determined by the laws of physics. This aspect of freedom is especially emphasized in the
Groundwork and in the second Critique. According to his epistemological metaphysics, we
have no direct access, as knowing beings, to the noumenal, to the real in itself. It is in the moral
life alone, through our willing of the moral law, which we break through into the noumenal.
The will, in willing the rule of reason, is free from the phenomenal realm and its laws, but
when we allow our passions to determine what we do, we give ourselves over to the
phenomenal and to physics and are thus not free. In “What is Enlightenment?” freedom from
others is Kant’s focus. To be morally mature is to be autonomous from other persons. This,
also, is grounded in Kant’s conception of the moral law. Each person, having reason, has equal
and easy access to the moral law, the categorical imperative. The equality of access here is
important. The moral law is built into reason, and the willing of the moral law is in fact
nothing other than the willing of reason. Because all persons have reason, we all have the
moral law given to us directly, rather than through others. The ease of access is important here,
too. Kant claims to merely formalize and defend philosophically, what we all know intuitively:
the golden rule, consistency of action, treating persons as persons. Making some individuals
more authoritative morally offends against both the ease and the equality of access to the moral
law. Being determined by desire subjects the will to the laws of physics; by looking to others
as moral authorities, we abdicate our sovereign throne as persons with reason and as
containing the moral law within us. In both cases, freedom to exercise our essential dignity as
persons requires freedom from desires and others lest we displace our own inner moral
authority, estranging ourselves from the moral law and from our own authenticity as persons
with reason. Of course, in being truly free, we are also bound. Instead of advocating
lawlessness as freedom, Kant maintains that freedom is binding oneself to duty. Thus, moral
maturity is giving oneself the law that defines one’s essence as a person and gives one dignity.
Kant’s ethics focuses on autonomy or moral maturity as rationality and freedom from
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heteronomy. Aristotle’s ethics does not focus on these concepts, but rather on the inborn human
telos, happiness, the virtues and their exercise, prudence, friendship, and contemplation –
anything that goes into a human life turned out well, to use Robert Spaemann’s rendering of
eudaimonia (19). I would like to force Aristotle to speak in our modern idiom. What does he
have to say about us in terms of autonomy and moral maturity?
If we focus on the end of De Anima III.11-12 (434a and 434b), we see that freedom first
arises for Aristotle in the non-rational voluntary movement of animals. Having sensation,
animals also experience pleasures and pains. The lowest level animals have touch and an
indefinite imagination, but lack the distant senses of sight, hearing, and smell and lack the
capacity for forward movement. Even these “imperfect animals,” like jellyfish, perform the
voluntary local motion of taking in desired things and rejecting undesired things. So-called
“perfect” animals, having some distant senses, also perform forward movements, exercising a
mobility to pull toward or push away from objects that cause pleasure or pain. This is a
freedom to move, but it is not a raw freedom – it is bound to a particular sensed thing as it
shows up as good in pleasure and desire. At the next level, most animals also have a definite
imagination, a quasi-sensory discernment of objects not immediately given to the five senses.
This is an additional level of freedom: freedom from the immediate, sensed present and
freedom to pursue or flee the sensible thing not here but just around the corner. By rejecting as
absurd the denial of voluntary movement to children and brutes, Aristotle insists that all this
movement in response to sensed and imagined things is willed movement. It is on this ground
that true, human freedom is built. The highest level of animal life is the adult human, but it
remains part of this continuum of animals. As De Anima III.10 explains (433b), we have not
just a sensory imagination but also a “calculative” imagination by which we can consider and
weigh several goods together, and with a deeper memory and longer sense of the future, we
discern many more goods to compare and weigh. With reason we can recognize the best and
decide upon certain goods among many. This opens up the possibilities of continence and
incontinence, and of deliberation and of choice. In De Anima III.9-12, reason appears mostly
as multiplying the number of things that we can discern and desire. From Nicomachean Ethics,
we also know that reason opens up new type of goods: reason itself as both practical and
theoretical is good, and it is so not merely as a new tool to get more of the same lower-level
goods.
At each level of animal life, voluntary movement involves two key factors, a faculty of
discrimination or knowledge (e.g., touch, sight, imagination, and thought) and a faculty of
desire (e.g., hunger, fear, and wish). Voluntary movement requires a particular object to be
apprehended and to be desired, so voluntary movement is always bound to how things appear
to us. Notice how Aristotle distinguishes between touch and taste, on the one hand, and sight,
smell, and hearing, on the other; then between sensation and imagination; then between a
sensory and a calculative imagination; and then between imagination and thought. These are all
faculties of discrimination, but at each level the animal increases its range, apprehending
objects further away in space or time. Aristotle hierarchically orders the levels of animal life
according to the degree of freedom from the immediately discerned and desired sensory
objects. At each level, the expanded range of discrimination out of the sensed present opens up
a new range of freedom, and that means a new set of desirable objects shows up. But
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movement is still always bound to an object apprehended and desired. For Kant, we must in
being morally mature not allow our will to be determined by particular desired goods. For
Kant, we must, rather, declare independence from the appearances and always will the good
will itself. In contrast, for Aristotle, our sensory apprehension of and desire for goods do not
undermine freedom or voluntariness but form its ground.
For Aristotle, reason both enhances and catapults us beyond this apprehension and desire
for material goods. Thought, wish, and choice are part of the hierarchy – the continuum, in
animal life of the discernment of objects, the desire for goods, and self-movement – but reason
also transforms all of this upon which it is built. In the adult human, thought often opposes
desire for material goods sensed or imagined, giving rise to continence and incontinence. Most
of the practical virtues deal with mundane material or interpersonal goods, many of the same
type that animals can discern and desire, such as food, safety, victory, power, and sex. But we
have the ability to deal with these animal goods in a human way, by infusing our desires and
actions with reason. In doing so, we can get not only more of these goods or get them more
securely, but we also get to accomplish noble or beautiful actions with them. One need only
recall one’s last activity involving such animal goods as sex, food, or power to realize the
extent to which reason humanizes these goods, transforming them and making our actions with
them more beautiful or more ugly than any animal movement could be. Like his account of
voluntary movement, Aristotle’s ethics allows us to understand both the continuity of human
life with brute life and the radical changes that reason brings to the animal aspects of our lives.
Because Aristotle does not share Kant’s conception of the forces of matter as completely and
perfectly deterministic, freedom for him does not require autonomy defined against the desires
the way it does for Kant. Freedom for Aristotle arises within nature, not against it, and in
action we are always aiming for a particular good as it appears to us through the imagination.
The morally mature man is not free from the apparent good, but he is the one who uses reason
to ensure that the good appears to him truly.
What about autonomy from others? Authority is the function of those capable of directing
others to the true or the good. The virtuous person successfully trains his desires to harmonize
with the good. This training must start in childhood. The need for others’ authority, especially
in childhood, follows from the non-rational foundations of voluntary movement. Virtue does
not consist in the mere habituation of one’s desires, but it does require it. And this starts in
childhood by means of authorities praising or blaming our non-chosen but voluntary
movements, so that we begin to understand responsibility and so that our pleasures and pains
are connected with their proper objects.
That chosen virtuous actions by adult humans emerge out of the pre-chosen voluntary
movement of children shows that others’ authority has a positive, even crucial, role in ethics, at
least in childhood. What about adulthood? For Aristotle (as for Kant), the virtuous person is
autonomous from others’ direction and is a law unto himself (Politics 1284a14). But as
Aristotle claims in the Rhetoric, the moral law is not expressible in any finite formula. Our
best access to this moral law is the matured faculties of the virtuous person. The virtuous
person is the measure, and like the measuring stick from Lesbos, he bends with the oddly
shaped situations to measure them correctly when the letter of the law fails because of its
generality and inflexibility. Although raised by others and by the law, the virtuous person has
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not merely adopted others’ views or assimilated well to his culture. With their help, he has
acquired for himself a sensitively tuned faculty to discriminate the good and bad in his own
and in others’ actions. He can even recognize the inadequacies of the law that have cultivated
this sensitivity in him. Though Kant sees as necessary, for a historically limited time, a tough
but enlightened authority, like Frederick II of Prussia, who can set the ground for a people to
progressively enlighten themselves, Aristotle does not think the multitude of people can reach
moral maturity. For Aristotle, virtuous people really are permanently invaluable as moral
authorities for the multitude, which is stuck in the middle in continence or incontinence.
Aristotle denies both the equality and the ease of access to moral correctness, the two
features of Kant’s categorical imperative that allow Kant to denigrate, as a form of immoral
heteronomy, the exercise and honoring of moral authority. Many people do not become fully
virtuous, and for them the law and others’ authority remains important throughout life. In the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle quotes Hesiod: “Altogether best is he who has insight into all
things, / But good in his turn is he who trusts one who speaks well. / But whoever neither
himself discerns, nor, harkening to another, / Lays to heart what he says, that one for his part is
a useless man” (1095b). Although autonomous insight is best, we who lack insight into all
things are foolish if ungrateful for authorities with better understanding than ourselves.
Aristotle also denies the ease of knowledge of right and wrong. In a rejection of anything like
the categorical imperative, Aristotle denies that any formula or single principle is an infallible
guide to moral action. All actions deal with particulars, and general principles are good but
imperfect guides. The morally serious and virtuous person may not need moral authorities, but
the difficulty of knowing the best course of action may make other virtuous people
epistemically useful even to the morally mature man. Aristotle tells us that it is easier to
perceive, and thus enjoy contemplatively, the good actions of others. Moreover, in good
friendship decent people make each other better “by putting their friendship to work and by
straightening one another out, for they have their rough edges knocked off by the things they like
in one another” (1172a). It might also be easier to perceive the imperfection of actions done by
others. Other people’s opinions and actions would then take on a positive role in Aristotle’s
ethics, even for the virtuous person. The happy life of the person who puts virtue to work
throughout life is “self-sufficient” (1097b), but this self-sufficiency requires the virtue and
happiness of friends, as well.
Finally, Aristotle does come closer to Kant when he denies that reason is merely another
natural thing. For Kant, the radical independence of reason from nature makes freedom and a
good will the ultimate goods for us: it is with reason’s freedom that I attain the real me,
affirming the authentic dignity of my personhood, and here I break away from the appearances
and get through to the really real. We need to understand reason and freedom as radically
different from nature in order to be persons, and to be free from the determinism of nature,
according to Kant.
Likewise, for Aristotle, I am most truly my intellect, and true self-love means acting
reasonably, serving and exercising this highest part of me most of all. And likewise for
Aristotle, reason is not just another part of nature. It is ultimately god-like and immaterial. It is
simultaneously part of us and beyond us, and with it we can really, though imperfectly, be
united with the most real beings in and behind the cosmos. Nevertheless, Aristotle draws a

quite un-Kantian conclusion from the non-naturalness of reason and the identity of the core of
the person with the intellect. After all, Aristotle does not have a problem explaining free
movement within the physical world, as Kant does. Rather, it is in the theoretical operation of
the intellect that the moral life is culminated and surpassed, in our knowing and not in our
doing. Moral maturity and autonomy of the person, for Aristotle, is found most of all not in
willing but in knowing, in this superhuman ability in which we only share but in which we
should strive to share as much as possible.
For both Kant and Aristotle the person is most of all his reason, and moral maturity
requires a certain autonomy from desires and from others’ opinions. But for Aristotle our
freedom arises out of nature rather than as a completely separate domain. Because of this and
because knowledge of the moral law is not given easily or equally, to act morally we need a
prudence that is based in the full maturation of our animality (i.e., our desires) and a
willingness to submit to proper authority when it speaks. A deterministic view of nature mixed
with a dedication to the freedom and dignity of persons leads Kant to distance the person from
his animal side, and Kant’s view of the ease and equality of access to the moral law leads him
to denigrate authority and others’ roles in our moral activity. But does not moral maturity
require maturation of the whole person, including the animal side? And is it not morally mature
to recognize when others speak with authority in an area new to us and to recognize that others
are an integral part of our own moral life? Kant would doubtless also answer these questions
affirmatively, but Aristotle’s psychology and ethics allow us to recognize these facts more
easily than Kant’s do and so better illuminate human freedom and autonomy for us. Aristotle
allows us better to understand our complex nature as part of the continuum of animal life, while
also showing how reason transforms and allows us to surpass the merely animal. Moral
maturity is not just the autonomous rule of reason, but it is really the maturation of the whole
person: animal, social, and rational.
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